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Abstract 
Many human interactions involve patterns of turn-taking cooperation that can be modeled by 
the deeply paradoxical Centipede game. A backward induction argument suggests that 
cooperation is irrational in such interactions, but experiments have demonstrated that players 
cooperate frequently and earn better payoffs as a consequence. We formulate six competing 
theories of cooperation in Centipede games and report the results of 2 experiments, based on 
investigations of several closely matched games with different payoff structures and different 
methods of reaching decisions. The results show that turn-taking cooperation does not appear 
to be explained by reciprocity theory, activity bias theory, or a motive to maximize relative 
payoffs, but that collective rationality, in the form of a motive to maximize joint payoffs, and 
fuzzy-trace theory can explain cooperation in interactions of this type. Reciprocity increases 
cooperation across repeated games between fixed player pairs, but there is no evidence of 
reciprocity influencing cooperation within games. 
Keywords: Centipede game, fuzzy-trace theory, reciprocity, social value orientation, 
team reasoning 
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Reasons for Cooperating in Repeated Interactions: 
Social Value Orientations, Fuzzy Traces, Reciprocity, and Activity Bias 
Human relationships afford many opportunities for turn-taking sequences of 
cooperative actions. This familiar feature of human social life is recognized in expressions 
such as “You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours” and “One good turn deserves another.” 
Everyday examples include business associates taking turns writing references for each 
other’s job applications, next-door neighbors taking turns looking after each other’s pets, 
infantry soldiers taking turns providing covering fire for each other while advancing across 
disputed territory, house burglars taking turns acting as lookouts while their partners in crime 
steal property, and university professors taking turns reading and providing feedback on each 
other’s research grant applications. Typically, the benefit b to the recipient of each 
cooperative action is greater, or at least no smaller, than the cost c to the cooperator, so that c 
≤ b. In this article, we formulate several competing theories that might explain this ubiquitous 
and important form of behavior, and we report the results of empirical tests of these theories, 
using Centipede games. 
The strategic structure of reciprocal interactions of this type is depicted in Figure 1. 
This figure represents an eight-legged Centipede game (whose length could be extended 
indefinitely) involving two interactive decision makers or players, labeled A and B. The 
potential sequence of alternating decisions or moves is shown in the eight numbered decision 
nodes along the top row, and the players’ payoffs (accumulated gains or losses that are 
realized only when the game ends) are shown in the terminal nodes in the bottom two rows 
and at the extreme right, Player A’s payoffs stacked above Player B’s. Player A begins at the 
first decision node on the left by choosing either STOP or GO. If Player A stops the game 
immediately, then the payoffs are 8 units to Player A and 6 units to Player B. If Player A 
chooses GO, then this hands the decision to Player B, who has a choice of either STOP or GO 
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at the second decision node. At this second decision node, a STOP move yields accumulated 
payoffs of 6 units to Player A and 11 to B. The game continues in this way, and if neither 
player ever chooses STOP, then it terminates automatically after the eighth decision node, 
with accumulated payoffs of 20 units to Player A and 18 to B.  
A STOP move merely ends the game with a relatively favorable payoff to the player 
who chooses STOP. A GO move keeps the game going and, in this particular case, always 
costs the player who makes it two units and benefits the co-player five units, so we have c = 2 
and b = 5. The game models reciprocal turn-taking involving cooperation and defection, with 
GO moves generally representing cooperation, because they increase the joint payoff of the 
player pair at a cost to the GO-chooser, and STOP moves representing defection 
(noncooperation). 
Ever since the Centipede game was introduced (Rosenthal, 1981), its paradoxical 
character has intrigued decision scientists. The paradox is revealed by the following logical 
argument, showing why strictly rational decision makers would never cooperate. The 
argument begins with three standard game-theoretic assumptions: (a) Both players are 
instrumentally rational in the sense that, whenever they face a choice between two options, 
knowing that one yields a higher payoff than the other, they choose the higher-paying option. 
If the payoffs represent their true preferences, then this means nothing more than that people 
choose the options they prefer. (b) Both players know the specification of the game—the 
information shown in Figure 1—and anything that can be logically deduced from it. (c) 
Assumptions (a) and (b) are common knowledge, in the sense that both players know them, 
know that both know them, know that both know that both know them, and so on for as many 
iterations as required (see below).  
The backward induction argument proceeds as follows. If the eighth decision node 
were to be reached, then Player B would choose STOP, because that would earn a payoff of 
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20 units, whereas cooperating would earn only 18. Player B’s rationality, defined in 
assumption (a) above, and knowledge of the payoffs (b) suffice to ensure this decision. If the 
seventh decision node were to be reached, then it follows that Player A would defect, because 
that would earn Player A 17 units, whereas cooperating would earn only 15, because (a) and 
(b) plus just the first iteration of (c) imply that Player A knows that Player B would defect at 
the next opportunity. This argument unfolds step by step, with an additional recursive clause 
of common knowledge (c) required at each successive step, until we reach the first decision 
node on the left, where Player A would defect, earning a payoff of 8 units, because (a), (b), 
and seven iterations of (c) logically imply that cooperation would yield a payoff of 6 units at 
the second decision node, where Player A knows that Player B would certainly defect. 
Common knowledge can be understood intuitively without the cognitive burden of working 
through all the individual steps. For example, a public announcement in a room full of people 
immediately becomes common knowledge among the people present (Milgrom, 1981). 
The paradoxical character of the game is now clear. According to the backward 
induction argument, instrumentally rational players, who by definition invariably choose the 
right moves to maximize their own individual payoffs, earn only small payoffs, but irrational 
players earn much more by cooperating. In game-theoretic terminology, defecting at the first 
decision node is the optimal (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium of the Centipede game 
(Busemeyer & Pleskac, 2009; Nash, 1950, 1951; Rapoport, 2003). The backward induction 
argument has been endorsed as mathematically sound by Aumann (1995, 1998), among 
others, but even people who follow the White Queen in Through the Looking-Glass in 
believing “as many as six impossible things before breakfast” (Carroll, 1871, chap. 5) might 
want to fortify themselves with a mug of strong coffee before swallowing it. 
The Centipede game shown in Figure 1 has a joint payoff function that increases 
linearly, because the accumulated sum of the payoff pairs increases by 3 units following each 
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cooperative move: 14, 17, 20, 23, …, up to 38 on the right. In some social interactions, 
payoffs accumulate at an accelerating rate—for example, revisiting the example of two 
business associates who take turns writing references for each other’s job applications, 
perhaps each successive job is more important and better paid than the last, requiring a 
correspondingly longer and more detailed reference. Interactions with such accelerating 
payoffs are modeled by Centipede games with exponentially increasing payoff sums. In 
contrast to this there are classic bargaining interactions involving decisions that serve only to 
change the way a fixed payoff is divided, and such interactions can be modeled by constant-
sum Centipede games. Figure 2 shows an exponential Centipede game in which the payoff 
sums are 2, 4, 8, 16, …, 512 and a constant-sum Centipede game in which the payoff sum 
remains fixed at 400. In constant-sum Centipede games, GO moves are not strictly 
cooperative, because they do not increase the joint payoff of the player pair (a standard 
definition of cooperation). 
If the cost of a single cooperative move is c and the benefit to the recipient b, then in 
Figure 1, c = 2 and b = 5. If we further label a player’s own payoff x and the co-player’s 
payoff y, then, in Figure 2, the exponential Centipede game (a) has c = x/3 and b = 6y, and the 
constant-sum Centipede game (b) has b = c = x – y + 25 and x + y = 400. The exponential 
Centipede game is the canonical version most frequently discussed in the literature, but if the 
backward induction argument is valid, then all versions are at least as paradoxical as the 
better known Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Instrumental rationality is defined in terms of 
maximizing individual payoffs, yet in Centipede games, irrationally cooperative players earn 
better payoffs than rational players. Cooperative players could legitimately ask their rational 
colleagues the familiar question: “If you’re so clever, how come you ain’t rich?”  
Experimental investigations of Centipede games have reported rampant cooperation. 
The earliest experiments reported that only a tiny minority of players defected at the first 
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decision node, and a substantial minority cooperated even at the last (Bornstein, Kugler, & 
Ziegelmeyer, 2004; Fey, McKelvey, & Palfrey, 1998; McKelvey & Palfrey 1992; Nagel & 
Tang, 1998, Parco, Rapoport, & Stein, 2002). Subsequent experiments have generally 
corroborated these findings, thereby providing vivid instances of the way in which normative 
theory and psychological facts can pass each other by (Johnson-Laird & Shafir, 1993). 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Next, we formulate and comment on 
several theories that appear to explain cooperation in Centipede games. Then we report an 
experiment designed to test theories based on social value orientations, fuzzy-trace theory, 
and reciprocity. Following that, we report a second experiment designed to test theories based 
on reciprocity (in a different way) and activity bias. In the final section, we draw the threads 
together and formulate some general conclusions. 
Theories of Cooperation 
Whatever the reason players cooperate in Centipede games, it cannot be to maximize 
their individual payoffs, knowing that co-players are doing likewise, because if they followed 
such game-theoretic reasoning, then they would never cooperate. Why, then, do they 
cooperate? The aim of this article is to formulate several new theories and to test them 
experimentally, but first it will be useful to clear the ground by commenting on a plausible 
suggestion frequently put forward by people when they first encounter the problem. This is 
the notion that players do not understand the game and therefore make arbitrary or random 
moves. Bearing in mind that game theory specifies only one rational way of playing the 
game—defecting at the first decision node—and many irrational ways, this implies that 
cooperation can be explained away as random fumbling in the dark. 
This explanation overlooks the compelling intuitive appeal of cooperation. For 
example, the authors of this article understand the Centipede game, and the fact that we do is 
common knowledge among us, but if we played the game shown in Figure 1 with each other, 
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we would all cooperate up to the seventh decision node at least. We are happy to note that we 
are in excellent company. The Nobel prizewinning game theorist Reinhard Selten, discussing 
a closely related game, said that he would not follow backward induction: 
 
From my discussions with friends and colleagues, I get the impression that most 
people share this inclination. In fact, up to now I met nobody who said that he would 
behave according to [backward] induction theory. My experience suggests that 
mathematically trained persons recognize the logical validity of the induction 
argument, but they refuse to accept it as a guide to practical behavior. (Selten, 1978, 
pp. 132–133) 
 
Furthermore, if random fumbling were a major reason for cooperation, then we should expect 
a sharp decrease in cooperative choices when the game is repeated over many rounds as 
players’ understanding surely increases through experience, but experimental evidence shows 
only a small decrease or none at all (e.g., El-Gamal, McKelvey, & Palfrey, 1993; Fey, 
McKelvey, & Palfrey, 1996; McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992; Parco, Rapoport, & Stein, 2002). 
A more subtle and complex theory, based on bounded rationality rather than total 
incomprehension, is the agent quantal response equilibrium of McKelvey and Palfrey (1998). 
According to this theory, players make errors, and an equilibrium can be shown to result if 
they implement best replies to their co-players’ moves imperfectly, with errors that are less 
likely the costlier they are. This and other model-fitting theories (Kawagoe & Takizawa, 
2012; Rapoport, Stein, Parco, & Nicholas, 2003; Zauner, 1999) do an excellent job of 
describing and predicting behavior, but they do not even attempt to explain it 
psychologically. 
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The experiments described later in this article do not include tests of the random 
fumbling theory or formal model-fitting theories. We turn now to the most prominent 
cognitive and other psychological processes that appear to be capable of explaining 
cooperation in Centipede games and that are tested in the experiments that follow. These 
theories are prime examples of what Chater (2015) characterized as “cognitively informed 
rational models.” 
Social Value Orientation Theories 
Possible reasons for cooperating include motives to maximize relative payoffs (to beat 
the co-player by the largest possible margin) or joint payoffs (to earn as much as possible for 
the player pair, considered as a unit) rather than individual payoffs, as assumed by default in 
orthodox game theory. Relative payoff maximization and joint payoff maximization are 
usefully conceptualized in terms of the psychological concept of social value orientation 
(SVO), introduced by Messick and McClintock (1968) and McClintock (1972) to model 
selfishness and other-regarding motivations, including relative and joint payoff maximization 
(for reviews, see Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008; 
Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003; Van Lange, 2000). Early research focused on the individualistic 
SVO (maximizing individual payoffs), the competitive SVO (maximizing relative payoffs), 
and the cooperative SVO (maximizing joint payoffs). Subsequently, the equality-seeking 
SVO (minimizing the difference between payoffs) and the altruistic SVO (maximizing the 
co-player’s payoff) were added to the theory, and attention focused on a hybrid prosocial 
SVO combining the cooperative and equality-seeking orientations (e.g., Van Lange 1999; 
Yamagishi et al., 2013). Approximately 57% of people are predominantly cooperative, 27% 
predominantly individualistic, and 16% predominantly competitive (Au & Kwong, 2004), 
and SVO correlates significantly with personality descriptions given by friends and 
roommates (Bem & Lord, 1979) and predicts everyday activities, including volunteering for 
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charitable causes (McClintock & Allison, 1989; Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, & Van Vugt, 
2007). Messick and McClintock originally conceived of SVOs as an environmentally or 
circumstantially determined variable (what we call state SVO), and the earliest experiments 
explicitly ignored stable individual differences (trait SVO), although later research tended to 
focus on trait SVO and ignore state SVO. 
In two-player games, SVO can be formalized as follows (Colman, Körner, Musy, & 
Tazdaït, 2011). Utilities representing players’ true subjective preferences, revealed by their 
actual choices, are represented by the symbol U. Utilities that incorporate other-regarding 
preferences are interpreted as functions of the objective payoffs V of players and their 
co-players. The payoffs that are presented to participants in experimental games are objective 
payoffs, and as such they do not take other-regarding preferences into account. The key 
payoff transformations may now be defined as follows. Let vi and vj be the objective payoffs 
to Players i and j in a two-player game, and let si and sj be their chosen strategies. Player i is 
assumed to maximize a utility function ( , ) ( , ),i i j i i jU s s f v v=  and Player i’s SVO is a property 
of the particular function fi that reflects i’s motivation at the time. The individualistic SVO is 
defined for Player i by fi = vi (players simply maximize their own objective payoffs), the 
competitive SVO by fi = vi – vj (players maximize the difference between their own and their 
co-players’ objective payoffs), the cooperative SVO by fi = vi + vj (players maximize the sum 
of both players’ objective payoffs), the altruistic SVO by fi = vj (players maximize their co-
players’ objective payoffs), and the equality-seeking SVO by fi = –|vi – vj| (players minimize 
the difference between the objective payoffs). Players are invariably motivated to maximize 
their expected utilities U, as required by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1947) utility 
theory (Busemeyer, 2015), but these expected utilities may be individualistic, competitive, 
cooperative, altruistic, or equality-seeking, depending on individual differences between 
players and circumstances of the social interaction. 
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Competitive SVO. One obvious possibility is that cooperative moves in Centipede 
games are motivated by the competitive SVO. This may appear self-contradictory, but 
players may make cooperative moves, not through any desire to cooperate per se, but on the 
contrary in a competitive attempt to maximize relative payoffs—hoping to beat their co-
players by as large a margin as possible. In the exponential version in Figure 2 (top), Player 
A can defect at the first decision node and earn one unit more than Player B (earning 1.5 units 
compared to Player B’s 0.5); but by cooperating, Player A might hope to earn four units more 
than Player B by defecting at the third decision node, or to beat Player B by a larger margin 
by defecting even later in the game. This makes sense in the exponential Centipede game, 
and indeed in the constant-sum game (Figure 2, bottom), but it has no persuasive force in the 
linear Centipede game shown in Figure 1, because in that version the differences between the 
players’ objective payoffs do not increase on successive cooperative moves. This suggests an 
experimental test of this theory that could falsify it decisively if it is wrong, by determining 
whether players cooperate in games with constant or decreasing payoff differences, and this 
idea is incorporated in Experiment 1, described below.  
Cooperative SVO. A closely related theory postulates a form of collective rationality 
captured by the cooperative SVO. Perhaps players aim to maximize joint payoffs—seeking to 
make the sum of payoffs to the player pair as large as possible. Collective rationality 
underlies theories of team reasoning (Bacharach, 1999, 2006; Sugden, 1993, 2005), and 
experimental evidence has confirmed that this occurs in suitable games (Bardsley, Mehta, 
Starmer, & Sugden, 2010; Butler, 2012; Colman, Pulford, & Lawrence, 2014; Colman, 
Pulford, & Rose, 2008). In all versions of the Centipede game apart from the constant-sum 
version, the sum of payoffs to both players increases as the game progresses, but in the 
constant-sum version, by definition, it remains fixed. This suggests an obvious experimental 
test of cooperative SVO theory, namely comparing cooperation in constant-sum Centipede 
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games with cooperation in versions with other payoff functions. Experiment 1, described 
below, includes this test. 
Equality-seeking SVO. In most Centipede games, inequality between the players’ 
payoffs increases as successive cooperative moves are made. In both games in Figure 2, for 
example, the payoff difference is smaller after early than later defections. However, there are 
Centipede games in which payoff differences remain constant, as in Figure 1, and others in 
which payoff differences decrease. In view of experimental evidence that equality-seeking (or 
inequality aversion) has a powerful and pervasive effect on decision making in laboratory 
experiments and everyday life (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; van den Bos et al., 2011; Van Lange 
1999; Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997), Experiment 1, described below, 
includes an investigation of the equality-seeking motivation. 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory 
According to fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991, 1995, 2008, 2011), 
decision makers faced with problems such as the Centipede game generally encode and store 
two types of mental representations in parallel: verbatim representations, including precise 
numerical details, and gist representations, based on the most basic level of measurement that 
enables a decision to be made. A gist representation may be a categorical gist (some/none) 
or, if that fails to yield a determinate decision, then an ordinal gist (more/less, larger/smaller, 
some/more, and so on). Most adult decision makers prefer gist representations for reasoning 
and decision making, because they simplify and clarify reasoning tasks, and also because 
forgetting rates are higher for verbatim traces. 
A possible explanation of cooperation in the Centipede falls out naturally from fuzzy-
trace theory, in three parts. First, the most basic gist for players at the beginning of the 
versions in Figure 1 and Figure 2 (top) is the ordinal some/more gist: STOP → certainty of 
small payoff and GO → possibility of larger payoff. This emerges from even the most cursory 
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glance at the game tree and, because players assumedly prefer larger to smaller payoffs, the 
theory predicts that they will therefore cooperate. Second, in linear Centipede games such as 
Figure 1, the same interpretation applies at later decision nodes, until the end of the game 
approaches, when STOP → certainty of small payoff no longer holds; hence fuzzy-trace 
theory predicts that players will tend to exit before the end of the game. Third, if we assume 
that players judge the magnitude of the possible payoff resulting from cooperation by 
estimating the average of the possible resulting payoffs, then this gist-based reason for 
cooperating seems less compelling in the constant-sum version shown in Figure 2 (bottom). 
Without calculation, Player A may not judge the average payoff following a GO move at the 
first decision node (actually 213) to be appreciably larger than the payoff resulting from a 
STOP move (200). For Player B, the average payoff following a GO move at the second 
decision node (182) is actually smaller than the payoff resulting from a STOP move (225). At 
later decision nodes, this is true for both players. Fuzzy-trace theory therefore suggests earlier 
defection in constant-sum versions, and this will also be tested in Experiment 1, described 
below. 
Reciprocity Theory 
Perhaps players are motivated to cooperate in Centipede games by considerations of 
reciprocity. The concept of reciprocal altruism was introduced by Trivers (1971) to explain 
the evolution of cooperation. He illustrated his idea with a hypothetical scenario in which a 
swimmer A with cramp has a 50-50 chance of drowning unless a passer-by B jumps in and 
attempts a rescue, in which case there is a 1 in 20 chance that both A and B will drown. If B 
believes that the situation will be repeated at some later date with the roles reversed, and that 
A will return the favor only if B helps on this occasion, then, by helping on this occasion, B 
trades a 50-50 chance of drowning at the later date (if A does not help) for a 1 in 10 chance (a 
1 in 20 chance of drowning while trying to save A, plus 1 in 20 chance when A tries to save 
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B). It is therefore rational for B to help A, in spite of the danger. It turns out to be worthwhile 
whenever the benefit/cost ratio b/c > 1/p, where p is the probability of a later opportunity for 
cooperation arising with roles reversed (Nowak, 2006). When this probability is a certainty, 
as in Trivers’s example, p = 1 and therefore 1/p = 1, and it pays to help whenever the cost to 
the cooperator is less than the benefit to the recipient, that is, whenever b/c > 1, and hence 
whenever c < b. 
Reciprocity is recognized as one of the most important explanations for cooperation 
(Imhof & Nowak, 2010; Trivers, 2005). Whether or not it provides an adequate explanation 
of cooperation in Centipede games can be tested by comparing how the game is played in its 
usual extensive form, in which players move sequentially, with how it is played in the so-
called normal form (not the usual form for this game) in which both players simply specify 
simultaneously at which decision node they would defect. A normal-form Centipede game 
provides no opportunity for reciprocity, because players make single, simultaneous decisions, 
and there is no opportunity for returning favors. Any cooperation that is observed in such 
circumstances must have some other explanation. Experiment 2, reported below, includes the 
relevant comparison. 
Activity Bias Theory 
It is possible that players cooperate in Centipede games because of a bias in favor of 
doing something active rather than stopping the game. This may initially seem unlikely, 
because an opposite phenomenon, called omission bias, is well established in the judgment 
and decision making literature. Kahneman and Miller (1986) argued that commissions should 
lead to greater regret than omissions in decisions with possible negative outcomes, and Ritov 
and Baron (1990) showed that people are indeed reluctant to vaccinate children when the 
vaccination itself can cause death, even when they know that death from the vaccination is 
much less likely than death from the disease. However, Landman (1987) and Gleicher, Kost, 
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Baker, Strathman, Richman, and Sherman (1990) found evidence for action bias in decisions 
involving positive outcomes.  
We use the term activity bias to denote something slightly different: a more specific 
tendency in Centipede games to prefer activity (cooperation, allowing the game to continue) 
to inactivity (defection, stopping the game), and we hypothesize three reasons for it. First, 
cooperation is necessary to enable the co-player to participate and earn financial rewards, 
whereas defecting effectively shuts out the co-player and may therefore be considered 
impolite. Second, the demand characteristics of experiments, first adumbrated by Orne 
(1962), implicitly require activity from participants, and terminating an experiment 
prematurely may be interpreted as spoiling it, refusing to engage with the task, or behaving 
foolishly. Third, there is evidence that experimental participants generally prefer activity to 
inactivity (Wilson et al., 2014). 
Activity bias theory, like reciprocity theory, lacks traction when the Centipede game 
is played in normal form, with each player making just a single strategy decision to cover all 
contingencies, because this provides no scope for further activity. A comparison of 
cooperation in normal-form and extensive-form Centipede games should reveal whether this 
theory has any validity, and relevant experimental evidence is reported in Experiment 2 
below.  
Next, we report an experiment designed to test SVO, fuzzy-trace, and reciprocity 
theories. This will be followed by a second experiment, carried out simultaneously with the 
same participant pool, involving a comparison with one of the treatment conditions in 
Experiment 1, designed to test reciprocity theory more directly and also to test activity bias 
theory. 
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Experiment 1 
The aim of this experiment is to provide controlled tests of social value orientation 
theories, especially competitive SVO theory and cooperative SVO theory, and also fuzzy-trace 
theory and reciprocity theory. This is achieved by comparing cooperation in Centipede games 
with subtly different payoff structures. Theories of reciprocity and activity bias are tested in 
Experiment 2. 
Method  
Participants. The participants were 186 students and employees at the University of 
Leicester (112 female, 74 male), aged 18–53 years (M = 22.21, SD = 5.24) recruited via an 
electronic bulletin board at the university. The sample size was set in advance. Around 60% 
were British, 7% other European, 13% Chinese, and the rest were a diverse spread from 
around the world. Participants were remunerated according to a between-subjects version of 
the random lottery incentive system, a technique that successfully avoids problems associated 
with other payment schemes (Lee, 2008) and has been shown empirically to elicit true 
preferences (Cubitt, Starmer, & Sugden, 1998; Starmer & Sugden, 1991). We paid each 
participant a show-up fee of £5.00 (about $8.00) and entered every participant into a lottery 
in which three winners were paid an additional amount, up to a theoretical maximum of £84 
($134), according to their average payoffs across 20 repetitions of the Centipede game that they 
played in the experiment. In fact, the three lottery winners received £39.55, £40.75, and £52.30. 
Materials. The basic materials included four linear Centipede games with different 
payoff structures (see Figure 3): a constant payoff-difference game, a constant-sum game, an 
increasing payoff-difference game, and a decreasing payoff-difference game. We did not use 
an exponential Centipede game, because it would then have been impossible to match it with 
other games required for our experimental purposes. For optimal experimental control, the 
four Centipede games that we devised are as similar as possible to one another, apart from 
certain differences in their payoff structures. In particular, they have identical numbers of 
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decision nodes and similar payoff ranges, and they are all linear Centipede games with payoff 
sums satisfying y = ax + b, where y is the sum of Player A’s and Player B’s payoffs at a given 
decision node, x is the decision node number, and a and b are constant parameters defining 
particular linear payoff functions. For Game (a) in Figure 3, a = 10 and b = 40; for Game (b), 
a = 0 and b = 104; for Game (c), a = 6 and b = 54; and for Game (d), a = 15 and b = 27. For 
each game, two versions of the instructions were prepared to take account of different pairing 
conditions: anonymous fixed pairing of players throughout the 20 rounds, or anonymous 
random pairing after each round. Random pairing removes the possibility that a player may 
cooperate on one round with the conscious or unconscious aim of influencing the co-player to 
cooperate on the next. 
To measure social value orientation, we asked all participants to fill in the 
Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Values (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 
1997). This is a short (nine-item) questionnaire-based measure of trait social value 
orientation. 
Design. The experimental design was a between-subjects, two-factor, Game × Pairing 
factorial design. There were no additional unreported conditions. Participants were assigned 
randomly to one of the four games (constant payoff-difference, constant-sum, increasing 
payoff-difference, decreasing payoff-difference) and to one of the two pairing conditions, 
anonymous fixed pairing or anonymous random pairing (perfect stranger matching), and they 
remained in the same treatment conditions and in the same role (Player A or Player B) 
throughout the 20 rounds of the game. Under both fixed and random pairing, participants 
were unaware of the identity of their co-players. The principal dependent variable was the 
mean exit node across all player pairs. 
Procedure. The experiment was conducted during 12 one-hour testing sessions, with 
approximately 14 to 24 participants per session in a single very large laboratory, and was 
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controlled with custom software. The participants were randomly assigned to different 
treatment conditions within each testing session. After signing a consent form, each 
participant sat in front of a networked computer monitor that displayed the appropriate game 
for the relevant treatment condition. The game was displayed diagrammatically, as in Figure 
1, but with decision nodes and payoffs in different colors for Player A and Player B. Textual 
instructions, accompanied by examples, explained the rules of the game, the payoff functions, 
the number of rounds to be played, and the incentive scheme. Each participant was also given 
a leaflet containing a diagram of the relevant Centipede game and a summary of the 
instructions. 
The wording of the instructions was identical across treatment conditions, apart from 
information relating to specific payoffs that varied between treatment conditions and 
instructions regarding pairing after successive rounds: “You will be paired with the same 
other participant each time” or “You will be randomly paired with a different participant each 
time.” The on-screen instructions concluded as follows: 
 
At the end of the experiment you will be entered into a lottery. Three people will have 
their average payoff across all decisions converted to cash. Therefore, it is in your 
interest to consider the payoffs and choose between GO or STOP carefully, as this 
will determine how much cash you could be paid.  
 
The experimenter showed the participants a large pile of money to help convince 
them of the reality of the incentives, and invited them to seek clarification about anything 
they did not understand. The participants worked through the experiment, interacting via their 
terminals at their own pace, apart from a constraint imposed by the anonymous pairing 
treatment conditions that sometimes required players to wait for a new co-player to complete 
REASONS FOR COOPERATING 19 
a previous round before beginning the next round. At the start of each round, participants 
were reminded on-screen of their role as Participant A or Participant B as well as the number 
(out of 20) of the current round, and the Centipede game diagram was accompanied by the 
following text: “Participant A can choose to click on GO or STOP at (1) on the diagram 
above. Participant A please make your decision now. Participant B please wait for the 
outcome.” Whenever a player defected by clicking STOP, the on-screen text reminded both 
players of the payoffs to each. After completing 20 rounds, participants were asked to fill in 
the questionnaire designed to measure trait SVO, then they were thanked, and demographic 
information and email addresses were recorded. Once all testing sessions were complete, 
three participants were randomly selected and remunerated with the average of their payoffs 
across all 20 games. 
Results1 
Mean exit nodes. Figure 4 displays the proportion of games ending at each of the 
terminal nodes, in each of the four experimental games, under fixed or random player pairing, 
and Figure 5 shows the mean exit nodes per round across the four games under fixed and 
random pairing. 
A two-way ANOVA, with player pairs as the units of statistical analysis, examined 
the effects of game and pairing factors on mean exit nodes. The mean exit node differed 
significantly across games: F(3, 85) = 12.93, p < .001, partial η2 = .31. In the constant-sum 
condition the mean exit node was 2.82; in the constant payoff-difference condition it was 
4.02; in the increasing payoff-difference condition it was 4.48; and in the decreasing payoff 
condition it was 5.80. Each of these means differs significantly from each of the others (p < 
.02, LSD test) apart from the difference between the increasing payoff-difference and the 
constant payoff-difference conditions. There was also significantly greater cooperation, 
resulting in a slightly later mean exit node, under fixed pairing (M = 4.62) than under random 
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pairing (M = 3.94), and this difference is small but significant: F(1, 85) = 3.94, p = .05, 
partial η2 = .04. There was no significant interaction between pairing condition and game (F 
< 1). 
Time series.2 Figure 6 shows the sequence plots of mean exit nodes over the 20 
rounds of the experiment, under fixed pairing and random pairing, in each of the four 
experimental games. It is obvious by inspection that there was more cooperation under fixed 
than random pairing across almost all 20 rounds in all games except the decreasing payoff-
difference game. We performed time series analysis (e.g., Bisgaard & Kulahci, 2011; 
Chatfield, 2003; Shumway & Stoffer, 2006; Yanovitzky & VanLear, 2008) to the mean exit 
nodes, recorded for each round, in each of our treatment conditions—four distinct games 
crossed with fixed or random pairing. Time series analysis is a dynamic method of analysis 
that provides estimates of the nature and strength of effects of earlier decisions on later 
decisions and of the form of the overall trend over rounds. We relied on the SPSS Expert 
Modeler to select the best-fitting models to the time series. 
In the constant payoff-difference game under fixed pairing, the best-fitting model is 
an ARIMA(0, 0, 0) model, indicating a lack of temporal structure in the data; but under 
random pairing the best fit is provided by a Holt model, an exponential smoothing model that 
fits time series with autocorrelation and linear trend, confirming the significance of the 
decline in cooperation over rounds under fixed pairing that is apparent in the sequence plot in 
Figure 6. In the constant-sum game, once again, the best-fitting model under fixed pairing is 
an ARIMA(0, 0, 0) model, indicating a lack of temporal structure in the data, and under 
random pairing the best fit is a Holt model, confirming linear and statistically significant 
decline in cooperation over rounds. In the increasing payoff-difference game under both fixed 
and random pairing, a Holt model provides the best fit, indicating a significant linear decline 
in cooperation over rounds. In the decreasing payoff-difference game, the best fit under fixed 
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pairing is a Holt model and under random pairing is an exponential smoothing Brown 
model—a simple one-parameter version of the Holt model, also indicative of linear trend. 
These results suggest that, under both fixed and random pairing, cooperation declined 
significantly and linearly over rounds in the decreasing payoff-difference game. 
SVO and defection. We summed the number of times that each participant defected 
(out of 20 rounds) and correlated these sums with their SVO subscale scores (cooperative, 
individualistic, and competitive). To assess the significance of the correlations while 
controlling for multiple tests, we tested the correlations against a false discovery rate of q* = 
.05 (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). The results are displayed in Table 1. Under random 
pairing, there is a significant correlation (r = .61) between competitive SVO subscale score 
and frequency of defection in the decreasing payoff-difference game, but not in any other 
game. All other correlations are non-significant. Analyses also revealed no significant 
influence of gender on how often participants defected; males defected 9.07 times on average 
and females 8.88, t(184) = 0.30, p = .76. 
Discussion 
According to competitive SVO theory, cooperative moves in Centipede games are 
motivated by players seeking to maximize the difference between their own payoffs and 
those of their co-players, by enticing their co-players to cooperate and then defecting against 
them later. If this were the sole reason for cooperation, then we should expect no cooperation 
at all in games with decreasing payoff differences, because in any such game, a player 
maximizes the payoff difference by defecting as early as possible. Our results revealed, on 
the contrary, that players defected significantly later, on average, in the game with decreasing 
payoff differences than in any other game (see Figures 4, 5, and 6). However, in the random 
pairing condition, players with high scores on the competitive SVO subscale tended to defect 
significantly more frequently than others in the game with decreasing payoff differences (see 
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Table 1). Hence, the high overall level of cooperation in the game with decreasing payoff 
differences must be due to the behavior of players with other types of SVO. Competitive 
SVO is clearly refuted as a general explanation of cooperation in Centipede games. 
According to cooperative SVO theory, Centipede games with increasing payoff sums 
should elicit more cooperation than the constant-sum game that we included in our 
experiment. The evidence clearly confirms this prediction: significantly less cooperation 
occurred in the constant-sum game than in the other games used in the experiment, all of 
which have increasing payoff sums (see Figures 4, 5, and 6), and the differences are quite 
striking. The same effect is predicted by fuzzy-trace theory, although for an entirely different 
reason (see below). 
In our other games, the constant-sum game and increasing payoff-difference game, 
cooperation increases payoff inequality, but each cooperative move provides a larger benefit 
to the co-player than the last. This may be attractive to cooperative players in particular and 
may motivate them to continue cooperating in those games in spite of the increasing payoff 
inequality that results, because cooperative players tend also to be altruistic. 
The equality-seeking SVO on its own cannot explain cooperation in Centipede games 
in general, because in most such games cooperation does not cause payoffs to become more 
equal. The exception is the (unusual) decreasing payoff-difference game that we included in 
our experiment. Figure 5 shows that cooperation was indeed much higher in this game than in 
any other, and our data therefore provide further evidence for the widespread inequality 
aversion that has been noted by previous researchers (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; van den Bos et 
al., 2011; Van Lange 1999; Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). There is no 
other obvious explanation for this finding. 
Fuzzy-trace theory predicts cooperation at the early decision nodes in all four versions 
of the Centipede game shown in Figure 3, because the most primitive gist that yields a 
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determinate decision, the some/more ordinal gist, suggests that a STOP move leads to a small 
payoff and a GO move the possibility of a larger payoff, and it is clear from Figures 4, 5, and 
6 that this prediction is confirmed. This theory also predicts that, in all four versions of the 
game (all linear Centipede games), players will tend to cooperate less at later decision nodes, 
because at later nodes the certain payoff from defection is no longer appreciably smaller than 
the expected payoff from cooperating. Figure 4 shows that this prediction is confirmed in the 
constant payoff-difference and constant-sum game, and generally confirmed from the third 
decision node onwards in the increasing payoff-difference game. The decreasing payoff-
difference game appears to be a special case, with an unusual pattern of cooperation over 
decision nodes. 
Fuzzy-trace theory also predicts less cooperation and earlier defection in the constant-
sum version in Figure 3 than in the other versions, because Player A’s average payoff from 
cooperation at the first decision node (53.5) may not be appreciably larger, without 
calculation, than the payoff that is certain to result from defection (52), and Player B’s 
average payoff from cooperation at the second decision node (50) is less than the payoff from 
defection (55), with similar considerations at later nodes, whereas in the other games the 
average payoff from early cooperation is much larger than from early defection. The 
some/more ordinal gist thus leads to the prediction of less cooperation in the constant-sum 
version. It is evident from Figures 4, 5 and 6 that this prediction was also confirmed. 
According to reciprocity theory, players cooperate in Centipede games in the hope 
that their co-players will respond reciprocally and that both will benefit from mutual 
cooperation in the long run. If this process plays a major part in explaining cooperation in 
general, then we should expect greater cooperation in the fixed pairing than the random 
pairing treatment conditions, because fixed pairing allows players to engage in reputation 
management, cooperating on one round in the hope of influencing their co-players’ 
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cooperativeness on a later round. That is exactly what we observed, except in the decreasing 
payoff-difference game (see Figure 5). It is worth commenting that this effect may have 
occurred without the conscious awareness of the players. The probable reason why no 
significant reciprocity appears to have been elicited in the decreasing payoff-difference game 
is that it was unnecessary. Equality-seeking is known from previous research to be a powerful 
motive in experimental games (e.g., Au & Kwong, 2004; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; van den Bos 
et al., 2011; Van Lange 1999; Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997; Yamagishi et 
al., 2013), and this is the only one of our games in which cooperation has the incidental side-
effect of increasing equality. Cooperation on early rounds was far higher than in any of the 
other games, and although it declined slightly over later rounds, it remained higher than in 
any other game (see Figures 4 and 6). We suggest that, in this decreasing payoff-difference 
game, even in fixed pairing conditions, players felt less need to encourage cooperation from 
their co-players through reciprocity, because they expected increasing equality to have this 
effect in any case. 
Our data show clear evidence of between-game reciprocity in the other games (apart 
from the decreasing payoff-difference game), because there is no other obvious explanation 
for the significantly greater cooperation in the fixed than random pairing conditions. But this 
does not constitute evidence for reciprocity as a driver of cooperation within Centipede 
games, or in repeated plays under random pairing. Experiment 2 provides a stringent test of 
reciprocity theory as an explanation of cooperation within individual Centipede games. 
Experiment 2 
The main purpose of this experiment is to test reciprocity and activity bias theories of 
cooperation in Centipede games. This is achieved by comparing cooperation in the linear 
constant payoff-difference game (Figure 3, top), played in its usual extensive form, with 
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cooperation in a normal-form version of the same game. Other factors that might influence 
cooperation were controlled as strictly as possible. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 48 students and employees at the University of 
Leicester (30 female, 18 male), aged 18–53 years (M = 23.23, SD = 6.20), 24 of whom 
participated in Experiment 1 and were assigned to the constant payoff-difference treatment 
condition with random pairing. In this second experiment, conducted in the same testing 
sessions as Experiment 1 to maximize comparability of procedures and participant pools and 
thus to optimize experimental control, 24 additional players were given the task of 
responding to a normal-form version of the game. The incentive scheme was exactly as in 
Experiment 1. 
Materials. The Centipede game used in this experiment was the constant payoff-
difference game (Figure 3, top) and a normal-form version of the same game (strictly 
speaking, the reduced normal form version, because we did not require players to specify 
how they would choose in situations that could not arise in the game; for example, if they 
chose to defect at the first decision node, then they did not also have to specify how they 
would choose at the third). Nagel and Tang (1998) reported the results of an experiment using 
a task that was isomorphic with the (reduced) normal form of a Centipede game, although it 
did not actually resemble a Centipede game. Their study made no attempt to compare choices 
in the normal form to choices in an equivalent extensive form of the game. As far as we are 
aware, no previous experimental study has reported differences in behavior between normal 
and extensive forms. 
Design. The experimental design was a randomized groups design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to treatment conditions involving the normal and extensive forms of the 
game. As in Experiment 1, the dependent variable was the mean exit node in each round. 
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Procedure. The procedure was as in the random pairing, constant payoff-difference 
treatment condition in Experiment 1, except that half the participants were randomly assigned 
to the normal form of the game. Instructions were as similar as possible in the two treatment 
conditions. In the normal-form condition, after reading the standard on-screen instructions 
explaining the Centipede game, with the same text and diagrams as in the extensive-form 
condition, participants were given the following special instructions: 
 
Instead of starting at the circle on the left and continuing until you or the other player 
chooses STOP, you and the other player will make a single decision on each decision 
sequence. This will save a lot of time in the testing session. You will consider the 
payoffs and choose the circle where you would STOP the decision sequence if the 
other player has not stopped it earlier. If you would not stop the decision sequence 
and would GO until the end then please click on the final GO in the sequence. . . . The 
computer will then take into account the circle number that you chose and the circle 
number that the other participant chose. Both you and the other participant will 
receive the payoffs at the circle with the lower number. You will be told the payoffs 
for this circle. You will then be randomly paired with a different participant and asked 
to make a decision at which circle to stop the decision sequence again. The decision 
sequence will be presented 20 times in total and you will be randomly paired with a 
different participant each time. You will never know who you are paired with. 
 
After 20 rounds had been completed, demographic information and email addresses 
were recorded. In all other respects, the procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. 
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Results1  
Mean exit nodes. Figure 7 shows the proportion of games ending at each terminal 
node in extensive form and normal form of the constant payoff-difference game with random 
player pairing. An analysis of mean exit nodes showed that the normal form elicited a similar 
mean exit node (M = 3.47) compared to the extensive form (M = 3.40), t(22) = 0.16, p = .87. 
Time series.2 We performed time series analysis once again on the mean exit nodes 
per round. Sequence plots of mean exit nodes in the normal-form and extensive-form 
treatment conditions are shown in Figure 8, from which it is immediately obvious that 
cooperation was similar in both conditions on almost every round of the game, from the first 
to the last. In both the normal form and the extensive form, a Holt model provides the best fit, 
confirming a linear decline in cooperation over rounds in both the extensive and normal 
forms of this game. It is worth commenting that Nagel and Tang (1998), who used a number-
choosing task, found no decrease in cooperation over 100 rounds. This suggests that their 
task, although formally equivalent to a normal-form Centipede game, may not be 
psychologically equivalent to it. Our normal-form Centipede game resembles the extensive-
form version as closely as possible. 
Discussion 
We found similar levels of cooperation in the game played in normal form and 
extensive form, with similar time series showing similar patterns of autocorrelation and linear 
decline over rounds. Both reciprocity and activity bias theories rely on repetitions to explain 
cooperation, and both therefore predict no cooperation in the normal form, or at least 
significantly less cooperation than the extensive form. Because the games were identical in 
all other respects and were presented to the players in the same way, the only difference 
being in how they played the game, this finding fails to corroborate both theories. This 
suggests that neither reciprocity nor activity bias can be a major driver of cooperation in the 
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Centipede game. Not only did a substantial level of cooperation occur in the normal-form 
treatment condition, but a similar level and pattern of cooperation was observed in this 
condition and in the extensive-form condition. In the normal-form condition, neither theory 
has any explanatory power, because the players have no scope for activity or reciprocal turn-
taking. Our findings therefore provide no support for these theories, because both rely on the 
opportunities for repeated cooperative choices in the course of dynamic play to explain why 
players cooperate in Centipede games. 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
The findings of our experiments permit some unexpectedly decisive answers to be 
given to the question of why people cooperate in repeated sequences of reciprocal actions 
even when, according to standard game-theoretic assumptions, a backward induction 
argument suggests that it is irrational to do so. The answer appears to be that cooperation may 
be motivated, in large part at least, by a desire to maximize the joint payoff of both 
interacting participants considered as a unit, or cooperation may result from players forming 
some/more fuzzy-trace representations of the structure of Centipede games. Our findings 
provide no evidence to support any of the other theories. We found evidence for inequality 
aversion and reciprocity, but neither of these could explain the cooperative behavior observed 
in the games. 
In terms of the conception of rationality that is generally accepted in decision theory 
and game theory, human decision makers are limited by bounded rationality (Simon, 1956, 
1982), and, if the backward induction argument is valid, then cooperation in repeated 
interactions must be rooted in some form of irrationality, because according to that argument 
rational players never cooperate. Formal theories based on special assumptions regarding the 
precise nature of the bounded rationality make fairly accurate predictions of behavior in 
Centipede games (McKelvey & Palfrey 1998; Rapoport, Stein, Parco, & Nicholas, 2003; 
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Zauner, 1999). But it is one thing to model irrational decisions mathematically and quite 
another to specify why these decisions are made and what motivates them. In this article, we 
examined six psychological theories of cooperation in Centipede games, all of which offer 
plausible reasons why players might cooperate, and we found decisive experimental evidence 
against three of them. 
We expected our experimental evidence to support reciprocity theory, partly because 
reciprocity is a well-established phenomenon in human interaction and partly because 
introspection seemed to suggest that the compelling urge to cooperate in Centipede games 
may be based on considerations of reciprocity. Reciprocity operated between (rather than 
within) some of the games in Experiment 1, in which each of our four experimental games 
was played by half the players under fixed pairing for 20 rounds and by the other half under 
random pairing after every round. In three of the four games, we observed significantly more 
cooperation under fixed than random pairing, persisting throughout virtually all 20 rounds, 
and the obvious explanation for this is reciprocity. Players in fixed pairing conditions must 
have cooperated partly in the hope or expectation that their goodwill would be reciprocated in 
later rounds. Nevertheless, reciprocity fails as an explanation of cooperation within individual 
games, because in Experiment 2, a similar level and pattern of cooperation occurred in the 
normal-form Centipede game, in which considerations of reciprocity do not arise, and in an 
equivalent extensive-form version of the same game, in which there was scope for reciprocity 
to operate. This finding also casts doubt on activity bias theory, because there is no 
opportunity for activity in the normal form, yet players cooperated just as much.  
We tested two theories based on social value orientations in Experiment 1, and one of 
them fared badly. Our results show that the competitive SVO, according to which players 
cooperate to maximize the difference between their own and their co-players’ payoffs by 
enticing them to cooperate and then exiting at later decision nodes, cannot explain 
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cooperation in Centipede games, because we observed significantly higher levels of 
cooperation in the decreasing payoff-difference game than in constant payoff-difference and 
increasing payoff-difference games, and that is exactly the opposite of what is predicted by 
the theory. The cooperative SVO, according to which players cooperate to maximize the joint 
payoff of the player pair, was corroborated by our data. In Experiment 1, we observed 
significantly less cooperation in the constant-sum game than in any of the other three games. 
Bearing in mind that the experimental games were closely matched, apart from necessary 
differences in their payoff functions, the only obvious explanation for this striking effect 
seems to be the fact that the constant-sum game is the only one in which the joint payoff of 
the player pair is not increased by cooperation. In other respects, the games are quite similar. 
We conclude from this that cooperation in Centipede games may be explained, at least in 
part, by collective rationality in the form of joint payoff maximization. There is evidence for 
joint payoff maximization in games very different from the Centipede game (Bardsley, 
Mehta, Starmer, & Sugden, 2010; Butler, 2012; Colman, Pulford, & Rose, 2008; Colman, 
Pulford, & Lawrence, 2014). The experiments reported in this article add another, quite 
different class of interactions that appear to elicit collective rationality. 
An alternative explanation for reciprocal cooperation in Centipede games that is also 
consistent with our data is supplied by fuzzy-trace theory. The some/more ordinal gist, the 
simplest that provides a player with a decisive way of choosing at the beginning of the game, 
is STOP → certainty of small payoff and GO → possibility of larger payoff. From this we can 
derive the predictions that players will cooperate at early decision nodes, that cooperation 
will decline at later decision nodes, and that cooperation will occur less frequently in 
constant-sum than increasing-sum Centipede games. All of these predictions were 
corroborated in Experiment 1, suggesting that gist representation can indeed explain our data. 
It is possible that cooperative SVO and fuzzy-trace theory may provide different parts of the 
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explanation for cooperation in Centipede games; further research is required on this issue. It 
goes almost without saying that there may be other factors at work that we failed to include in 
our investigation. If so, then cooperation in Centipede games may be explained by more than 
joint payoff maximization and fuzzy-trace theory, but it seems impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that these two processes provide at least large parts of the explanation. 
We found gentle declines in cooperation over rounds in most treatment conditions, 
some so slight that it was impossible to judge merely by inspection whether they were real, 
and time series analysis was necessary to establish their statistical significance. This pattern 
of results is in line with findings of previous research into two-player Centipede games, 
which have typically reported small declines or none at all. We also found evidence for 
inequality aversion, or the equality-seeking SVO, in Experiment 1. The decreasing payoff-
difference game, the only one of our four experimental games in which cooperation causes 
payoff differences to decrease, elicited significantly more cooperation than any other, and it 
is difficult to think of any explanation for this finding other than inequality aversion. This 
phenomenon is well established in other areas of experimental research (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999; van den Bos et al., 2011; Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 
1997) and, once again, our findings show the same mechanism operating in a different 
domain of social interaction. 
The experiments reported in this article go some way toward explaining cooperation 
in repeated interactions with the strategic structure of the Centipede game. Cooperation 
appears to be explained by a motive to maximize the joint payoff of the player pair, or by a 
tendency for players to respond to a gist rather than a verbatim representation of the problem, 
or possibly by both of these processes operating in tandem. Direct reciprocity appears to 
operate between repetitions of the game with fixed player pairing, but reciprocity does not 
explain cooperation within conventional Centipede games played sequentially. 
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Footnotes 
1 Raw data are presented in the supplemental materials. 
2 Details of the time series analysis are given in the supplemental materials. 
 
  
REASONS FOR COOPERATING 41 
Table 1 
Experiment 1: Product-Moment Correlations Between Numbers of Defections and Scores for 
Cooperative, Individualistic, and Competitive Social Value Orientation Under Fixed and 
Random Pairing in Four Games 
   Social Value Orientation 
Pairing Game N Cooperative Individualistic Competitive 
Fixed      
 Constant difference 24 –.314 .207 .200 
 Constant-sum 24 .178 –.219 .056 
 Increasing difference 22 –.116 .101 .063 
 Decreasing difference 22 –.262 –.119 .525 
Random      
 Constant difference 24 .444 –.338 –.242 
 Constant-sum 24 .178 –.210 .016 
 Increasing difference 24 –.220 .154 .061 
 Decreasing difference 21 –.413 .053 .605* 
*Significant with a Benjamini-Hochberg false discovery rate q* = .05. 
 
 






















Figure 2. (a) An exponential Centipede game with c = 1/3x, b = 6y. (b) A constant-sum 
Centipede game with b = c = x – y + 25 and x + y = 400. 
 







Figure 3. Linear Centipede games used in Experiment 1: (a) constant payoff-difference, (b) 
constant-sum, (c) increasing payoff-difference, (d) decreasing payoff-difference. 





Figure 4. Experiment 1: Proportion of games ending at each terminal node under fixed or random player pairing in four experimental 
Centipede games: constant payoff-difference, constant-sum, increasing payoff-difference, and decreasing payoff-difference. 





Figure 5. Experiment 1: Mean exit nodes for fixed pairing and random pairing in four Centipede 
games: (a) constant payoff-difference, (b) constant-sum, (c) increasing payoff-difference, (d) 

































Figure 6. Experiment 1: Sequence plots of mean exit nodes under fixed pairing and random pairing in the four linear Centipede 
games: constant payoff-difference, constant-sum, increasing payoff-difference, and decreasing payoff-difference. 






Figure 7. Experiment 2: Proportion of games ending at each terminal node in extensive form and normal form constant payoff-
difference games with random player pairing. 





Figure 8. Experiment 2: Sequence plots of mean exit nodes for a constant payoff-difference game played in normal form and 
extensive form. 
